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Listed below you will find information about my publications as well as abstracts of my current working papers. A downloadable version of my complete curriculum vitae is also available in Adobe Acrobat format. If you have any questions about my work, please contact me at tpollock@psu.edu. Thank you for your interest.
Boivie, S., Graffin, S.D. & Pollock, T.G. 2012. Time for me to fly: Predicting director exit at large firms. Academy of Management Journal, Forthcoming. Full Text PDF.
Lee, P.M., Pollock, T.G. & Jin, K. 2011. The contingent value of venture capitalist reputation. Strategic Organization, 9(1): 33-69. Full Text PDF.
Pfarrer, M.D., Pollock, T.G. & Rindova, V.P. 2010. A tale of two assets: The effects of firm reputation and celebrity on earnings surprises and investors' reactions. Academy of Management Journal, 53(5) 1131-1152. Full Text PDF. Winner, Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation Best Published Paper Award for 2010.
Mishina, Y., Dykes, B.J., Block, E.S. & Pollock, T.G. 2010. Why good firms do bad things: The effects of high aspirations, high expectations and prominence on the incidence of corporate illegality. Academy of Management Journal, 53(4): 701-722. Full Text PDF. Video of me discussing the study. Finalist, Academy of Management Journal Best Paper Award for 2010.
Pollock, T.G., Chen, G., Jackson, E.M. & Hambrick, D.C. 2010. Just how much prestige is enough? Assessing the value of multiple types of high-status affiliates for young firms" Journal of Business Venturing, 25(1): 6-23. Full Text PDF.
Pollock, T.G., Fund, B.R. & Baker, T. 2009. Dance with the one that brought you? Venture capital firms and the retention of founder-CEOs. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 3: 199-217. Full Text PDF.
Chen, G., Hambrick, D.C. & Pollock, T.G. 2008. Puttin on the ritz: Pre-IPO enlistment of prestigious affiliates as deadline-induced remediation. Academy of Management Journal, 51(5): 954-975. Full Text PDF.
Detert, J.R. & Pollock, T.G. 2008. Values, interests and the capacity to act: Understanding professionals' responses to market-based improvement initiatives in highly institutionalized organizations. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 44(2): 186-214. Full Text PDF.
Wade, J.B., Porac, J.F., Pollock, T.G. & Graffin, S.D. 2008. Star CEOs: Benefit or burden? Organizational Dynamics, 37(2): 203-210. Full Text PDF.
Pollock, T.G., Rindova, V.P. & Maggitti, P.G. 2008. Market Watch: Information and Availability Cascades in the U.S. IPO Market. Academy of Management Journal, 51(2): 335-358. Full Text PDF. Winner, 2009 AOM Entrepreneurship Division IDEA Award for best entrepreneurship research published in 2008.
Pollock, T.G. & Gulati, R. 2007. Standing out from the crowd: The visibility enhancing effects of IPO-related signals on alliance formations by entrepreneurial firms. Strategic Organization, 5(4): 339-372. Full Text PDF.
Wade, J.B., O'Reilly, C.A. & Pollock, T.G. 2006. Overpaid CEOs and underpaid managers: Fairness and executive compensation. Organization Science, 17(5): 527-544. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study
Wade, J.B., Porac, J.F., Pollock, T.G. & Graffin, S.D. 2006. The Burden of celebrity: The impact of CEO certification contests on CEO pay and performance. Academy of Management Journal, 49(4): 643-660. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study
Rindova, V.P., Pollock, T.G. & Hayward, M.L.A. 2006. Celebrity firms: The social construction of market popularity. Academy of Management Review, 31(1): 50-71. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study
Mishina, Y., Pollock, T.G. & Porac, J.F. 2004. Are more resources always better for growth? Resource stickiness in market and product expansion. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 1179-1197. Full Text PDF
Pollock, T.G. 2004. The benefits and costs of underwriters' social capital in the U.S. IPO market. Strategic Organization, 2(4): 357-388. Full Text PDF
Fischer, H.M. & Pollock, T.G. 2004. Effects of social capital and power on surviving transformational change: The case of initial public offerings. Academy of Management Journal, 47: 463-481. Full Text PDF
Hayward, M.L.A. Rindova, V.P. & Pollock, T.G. 2004. Believing one's own press: The antecedents and consequences of chief executive officer celebrity. Strategic Management Journal, 25(7): 637-653. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study
Pollock, T.G., Porac, J.F. & Wade, J.B. 2004. Constructing deal networks: brokers as network ‘architects’ in the U.S. IPO market and other examples. Academy of Management Review, 29(1): 50-72. Full Text PDF
Pollock, T.G. & Rindova, V.P. 2003. Media legitimation effects in the market for initial public offerings. Academy of Management Journal. 46(5): 631-642. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study. Reprinted in Strategies for New Venture Development, edited by Ari Ginsberg, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010.
Carpenter, M.A., Pollock, T.G. & Leary, M.M. 2003. Governance, the experience of principals and agents, and global strategic intent: Testing a model of reasoned risk taking. Strategic Management Journal, 24: 803-820. Full Text PDF. Reprinted in International Entrepreneurship, edited by Benjamin M. Oviatt and Patricia P. McDougal, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007.
Pollock, T.G., Fischer, H.M. & Wade, J.B. 2002. The role of power and politics in the repricing of executive options. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 1172-1182. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study
Pollock, T.G., Whitbred, R.C. & Contractor, N. 2000. Social information processing and job characteristics: A test and integration of two theories with implications for job satisfaction." Human Communication Research, 26(2), 292-330. Full Text PDF
Thomas, H. & Pollock, T.G. 1999. From I-O economics’ S-C-P paradigm through strategic groups to competence-based competition: Reflections on the puzzle of competitive strategy. British Journal of Management, 10(2), 127-140. Full Text PDF. Reprinted in Corporate Strategy (Vol. 1), edited by Jeffrey A. Krug, Sage Publishing, 2009.
Porac, J.F., Wade, J.B. & Pollock, T.G. 1999. Industry categorizations and the politics of the comparable firm in CEO compensation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(1), 112-144. Full Text PDF
Thomas, H., Pollock, T. & Gorman, P. 1999. Global strategic analysis: Frameworks and approaches. Academy of Management Executive, 13(1), 70-82. Full Text PDF
Wade, J.B., Porac, J.F. & Pollock, T.G. 1997. Worth, words and the justification of executive pay. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 18, 641-664. Full Text PDF
Wade, J.B., Porac, J.F., Pollock, T.G. & Meindl, J. 1997. Hitch your wagon to a CEO star? Testing two views about the pay, reputation and performance of top executives. Corporate Reputation Review,1:1-2, 103-107. Full Text PDF
Grant, A.M. & Pollock, T.G. 2011. From the Editors - Publishing in AMJ - Part 3: Setting the hook. Academy of Management Journal, 54(5): 873-879. Full Text PDF.
Baker, T. & Pollock, T.G. 2007. Making the marriage work: The benefits for strategic organization from strategy's takeover of entrepreneurship. Strategic Organization, 5(3): 297-312. Full Text PDF.
Barnett, M.L. & Pollock, T.G. (co-editors) The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Reputation. Oxford, UK Oxford University Press. Due to be published in 2012.
Fund, B.R., Pollock, T.G., Baker, T. & Wowak, A. 2008. Who's the new kid? The process of becoming central in venture capitalist deal networks. In J.A.C. Baum & T.J. Rowley (Eds.) Advances in Strategic Management, 25. London, UK: Emerald Publishing: 563-593. Full Text PDF
Porac, J.F., Mishina, Y. & Pollock, T.G. 2002. Entrepreneurial narratives and the dominant logics of high growth firms. in Anne Huff & Mark Jenkins (Eds.) Mapping Strategic Knowledge, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage: 112-136. Full Text PDF
Mishina, Y., Pollock, T.G. & Bragaw, N.A. 2012. Know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em? Differentiating between loss aversion and the house money effect in CEO reactions to firm performance. Best Papers Proceedings, Academy of Management Annual Meeting, OMT Division.
Lee, P.M., Pollock, T.G. & Jin, K. 2007. Substance, symbolism and the 'signal strength' of venture capitalist prestige. Best Papers Proceedings, Academy of Management Annual Meeting, BPS Divsion.
Pollock, T.G., & Baker, T. 2005. Who's minding the store? Venture capitalist styles and the replacement of founder-CEOs. The Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Proceedings of the Babson/Kauffman Entrepreneurship Research Conference, 403-415.
Pollock, T.G., Gulati, R. & Sadler, A. 2002. Relational
and market-based legitimation of internet IPOs. Best Papers Proceedings,
Academy of Management Annual Meeting, BPS Division11-16. Full
Text PDF
Holehonnur, A. & Pollock, T.G. "Shoot for the stars? Predicting the recruitment of prestigious directors by newly public firms" Under Second Review at Academy of Management Journal
Abstract:This study explores how CEOs’ and outside directors’ desires for the benefits of signaling and homophily could intertwine with their concerns over maintaining power and preserving local status hierarchies to affect the likelihood a firm recruits prestigious outside directors to its board in the years immediately following its initial public offering. Using pooled cross-sectional data from 210 IPOs conducted between 2001 and 2004, we found that prestigious CEOs and directors viewed the recruitment of prestigious new directors differently, and that these perceptions were moderated by factors that increase the salience of risk of the potential losses to the CEO and existing board members.
Mishina, Y., Pollock, T.G. & Bragaw, N.A. Know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em? Differentiating between loss aversion and the house money effect in CEO reactions to firm performance Under First Review at Academy of Management Journal
Abstract: This study attempts to differentiate between the effects of loss aversion and the house money effect on CEO decision making by examining the effects of performance relative to aspirations on the CEO’s compensation mix, and whether these effects are influenced by the firm’s prominence. We find more general support for the predictions based on the house money effect than those based on loss aversion. Further, the prominence of the firm appears to decrease the percentage of cash compensation in the mix when performance is below aspirations.
Baker, T., Pollock, T.G. & Sapienza, H. J. Recipes for weak ingredients: Human capital bricolage and temporary competitive advantage
Abstract: This paper investigates human capital bricolage as a process through which resource constrained firms may effectively decouple resources from performance and create series of temporary advantages in competition against richer rivals. Unlike the permissive environments in which other forms of bricolage thrive, human capital bricolage is more likely to create value in highly competitive and low discretion environments. We theorize both the conditions and the managerial practices that support successful human capital bricolage. Our results help point toward a way of filling some longstanding gaps in resource-based theories of firm performance.
Fund, B.R., Pollock, T.G. & Tsai, W. The alienability of individual and organizational social capital
Abstract: We investigate how social capital can be transferred between individuals and organizations. We develop a typology of social capital transfer based on the locus of control over access to social capital and the cooperative orientation of individuals and organizations and identify key processes and mechanisms underlying each type of social capital transfer. This research promises to provide new insights into multi-level theorizing that can aid future research in studying more dynamic and process-oriented models of social influence.
Fund, B.R. & Pollock, T.G. Hero or Goat? Examining the interpretation and consequences of CEOs' extreme actions
Abstract: This study develops a theoretical model to explain how the extreme actions of a firm's chief executive officer and the assessments and expectations of key stakeholders can lead to changes in organizational routines. We consider how the stakeholders' initial assessments of the both the CEO and the action being taken, as well as the ultimate outcome of the extreme action, can disrupt routines that shape the CEO's reputation, compensation, leadership capabilities and discretion.
Protprakorn, R., Michael, J. & Pollock, T.G. Resisting isomorphism: Investigating the adoption of corporate environmentalism
Abstract: Isomorphism is thought to provide a variety of benefits to organizations. By adopting corporate environmentalism in response to pressures from stakeholders to be socially responsible, organizations receive further benefits from isomorphism. However, questions remain regarding why and under what conditions some organizations tend to resist isomorphism. Particularly, why do executives resist the adoption of corporate environmentalism when others are embracing it? The key findings of this study suggest that the scarcity of resources hinders organizations from adopting corporate environmentalism even when they perceive pressures from customers. This research has implications for helping organizations acquire the necessary resources for adopting environmental strategies.
